International War

Jack S. Levy

War has been a plague on humanity throughout history. Scholars in a wide range of disciplines have devoted an enormous amount of effort to explain the causes of war. Despite the intellectual energy devoted to this question, little consensus has emerged—not only across countries and disciplines but also within disciplines in a given country—regarding what the causes of war are, what methodologies are most useful for validating those causes, what criteria are appropriate for evaluating competing theories, and even whether it is possible to generalize about anything as complex and context-dependent as war.

The challenge in a short review essay on war is to find a way of making sense of the enormous range of scholarship on the many of types of warfare. Following the division of labor in this volume, I focus on international war, and more specifically on interstate war, which excludes colonial war and internationalized civil wars. I narrow the scope further by focusing on the question of the causes of war, which reflects the strong bias among scholars, at least in international relations and at least until recently, toward studying the causes rather than the conduct, termination, or consequences of war.

Although an understanding of the causes of war needs to draw on work in many disciplines, I focus here primarily on the international relations literature. Most scholars define war in terms of violence between political organizations (Vasquez 2009).[1] Many accept Clausewitz's ([1832]1976) emphasis on the fundamentally political nature of war, as reflected in his statement that war is a "continuation of politics by other means." This suggests that a full understanding of war requires an understanding of why the authorized decision-makers of adversarial political units—nation-states, tribes, or other political organizations—choose military force rather than another strategy for advancing their interests and resolving their differences.

It would be more useful to focus on a few of the major theoretical approaches rather than to attempt to survey the large number of competing theories of war.[2] I begin with realist theories of war, which emphasize anarchic international structures and the competition for power and which have long dominated the study of war in political science. I then turn to the "bargaining model of war", elements of which have been incorporated into both realist and liberal theories. I then turn to liberal theories of war and peace, with particular attention to the "democratic peace" and the "capitalist peace".

Realist Theories of War

The realist tradition—which goes back to Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau (Doyle 1997)—encompasses several interrelated theories that share a common set of assumptions: the key actors are sovereign states that act rationally to advance their security, power, and wealth in an anarchic international system.[3] Anarchy does not lead directly to war, but it creates a permissive environment for war. It creates insecurity and enhances uncertainty about the intentions of others, and it induces political leaders to focus on short-term security needs, adopt worst-case thinking, build up their military strength, and utilize coercive threats to advance their interests, influence the adversary, and maintain their reputations. The core realist hypothesis is that international outcomes are determined by, or at least significantly constrained by, the distribution of power between two or more states (Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001). This reflects Thucydides' (1996, 352) argument that "the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must." Different conceptions of power and different additional assumptions, however, lead to different realist theories and to conflicting predictions about the consequences of particular distributions of power.

Most realists agree that war can occur through either deliberate or inadvertent processes. First, a state may deliberately initiate unprovoked aggression to change the status quo, on the belief that it is more likely to achieve its interests through military force than through a negotiated settlement. Second, two states that are content with the status quo may stumble into an "inadvertent war". Anarchy and uncertainty often induce states to enhance their security through arms build-ups, alliances, and hard-line strategies to reinforce deterrence. These are often perceived as threatening by others and lead to counteractions and conflict spirals

that become difficult to reverse and that leave all states less secure (the "security dilemma" [Jervis 1976]). Conflict spirals are often exacerbated by domestic political pressures (Vasquez 2009) that prevent leaders from making concessions and by psychological mechanisms that reinforce aversion to losses.[4]

One of the oldest realist theories is *balance of power theory*, which posits that states define avoiding hegemony as their primary goal and maintaining an equilibrium of power in the system as an instrumental goal. The core prediction of balance of power theory is that states, and particularly great powers, will "balance" against any state that threatens to achieve a hegemonic position within the system, and possibly against other kinds of threats as well, by building up armaments and forming alliances. Many balance of power theorists argue that the balancing mechanism almost always works successfully to avoid hegemony, either because potential hegemons are deterred by their anticipation of the formation of military coalitions against them or because they are defeated in a "hegemonic war" after deterrence fails. A new line of research suggests that leading states recognize that resource limitations put global hegemony out of reach and that they limit their aims to regional hegemony (Mearsheimer 2001). Critics have argued that great powers have not always balanced and that hegemonies have sometimes emerged from multi-state systems (Vasquez and Elman 2003). Others criticize the universalist pretensions of balance of power theory, and argue that leading land powers are more threatening than leading sea powers and that other great powers often balance against the former but rarely against the latter (Levy and Thompson 2010).

Whereas balance of power theory posits that hegemonies rarely if ever arise, *power transition theory* (Organski 1958), which shares many realist assumptions but which emphasizes the existence of order within a nominally anarchic system, posits that extreme concentrations of power are common rather than rare and stabilizing rather than destabilizing. Leading states use their strength to create a set of political and economic structures and norms of behavior that enhance the stability of the system at the same time advance their own security. Over time, however, differential rates of growth among states lead to the rise of new elite powers. The probability of war peaks as the power

of the declining leader is overtaken by that of a rising, dissatisfied state.

The apparent contradiction between the balance of power hypothesis that an equality of power promotes peace and the power transition hypothesis that it promotes war is most likely explained by the fact that balance of power theories focus primarily on concentrations of land-based power in continental systems, while power transition theory's use of gross national product as the key measure of power introduces a bias toward commercial and naval powers in the global system. Thus it may be that concentrations of power are stabilizing in the global system but not in land-based systems, especially in Europe over the last five centuries (Rasler and Thompson 2000).

Although power transition theorists specify the conditions under which war is most likely, they devote little attention to the precise causal mechanisms leading to war. There is some debate over the question of the exact timing of the war—before, at, or after the point of power transition, but all power transition theorists argue that it is the rising challenger who initiates the war. This is both an important empirical question and a theoretical puzzle for the theory: why would a declining state wait for a rising, dissatisfied challenger to approach it in relative power, rather than initiate a *preventive war* (Levy 2008) against the rising challenger to eliminate or at least postpone the threat while the opportunity is still available? The anticipation that the adversary will cross a key threshold of power, including the nuclear threshold, can also trigger a military attack, as illustrated by Israel's strike against the Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981.

Declining power does not always lead to preventive war strategies, however, and a key question is the specific conditions under which states adopt such strategies in response to rising adversaries. Even more basic is the question of why the declining leader and rising challenger cannot reach some kind of agreement that each would find more attractive than a costly war? The "bargaining model of war" helps to answer this and other questions.

The "Bargaining Model of War"

The starting point for the bargaining model of war is the fact that war is costly, and that by destroying resources that might be distributed among adversaries war is an inefficient way to resolve conflicts

of interests. There must be some non-violent negotiated agreement that is mutually preferred to fighting. Why do states sometimes fail to reach such a negotiated settlement?

Blainey (1988) traced the answer to disagreements about relative power driven by misperceptions. If adversaries have similar expectations about the likely outcome of war, those expectations should provide the basis of a negotiated settlement that both parties prefer to war, since it assures each actor of the same outcome it could get from fighting, less the costs of war. If either side expected that it could gain more by war than by negotiation it would choose war. Since the primary determinant of the outcome of war is the relative power of two states, the critical question is whether states agree on their relative power. Blainey went on to argue that the course of fighting clarifies the nature of relative power, which leads to a convergence of expectations about the consequences of additional fighting, and thus to a settlement that terminates the war.

This was a powerful argument, but it had some theoretical limitations, including the failure to incorporate the actual costs of war, the issues at stake, and the risk preferences of leaders into a logically consistent model of conflict. Rational choice theorists in political science addressed these problems. Fearon (1995) acknowledged that psychological variables such as leaders' personalities or cognitive or emotional biases might provide one answer to the question of why states sometimes fail to reach a settlement, and that leaders' prospects of domestic political gains from war might provide another, but he focused on rational unitary actors. Fearon made some very basic assumptions and then used the analytic techniques of game theory to prove that when these assumptions hold there is always a set of negotiated settlements that both sides preferred to war. There are only three causal paths through which two rational unitary actors could end up in war: private information and incentives to misrepresent that information, commitment problems, and indivisible issues. I discuss the first two here, as most scholars downplay the importance of the third.

The private information path is a formalized version of Blainey's (1988) argument, since private information is the source of disagreements about relative power and hence a primary cause of war. Private information about military capabilities or strategy, secret alliances, resolve to fight a lengthy and costly war if necessary, or other factors that might affect the outcome of the war leads two sides' to different estimates of the likely outcome of the war and therefore to different assessments of what settlements yield outcomes better than war. The result is a narrowing of the bargaining space of mutually agreeable settlements and an increase in the probability of war. States have incentives to conceal information about their own weaknesses and perhaps even information about their strengths, for fear of giving the adversary an opportunity to take countermeasures—securing allies, mobilizing, changing military strategies, or preempting.

Even if two rational unitary actors each share the same information and consequently the same expectations about the likely outcome of war, however, they can still end up in war through a second causal path, one that involves a "commitment problem" (Fearon 1995; Wagner 2000). Consider the preventive war situation mentioned above, where a declining leader faces a rising challenger and where both have similar assessments of power and trends in power. The weaker but rising state has an incentive to reach a settlement, because it knows both that it is likely to lose any war fought now and that it will be in a better position to fight (or to get what it wants without fighting) in the future when it is the stronger state. The declining state would like in principle to reach a negotiated settlement that would provide for its security and other interests after it has been surpassed in strength, but it knows that once the adversary is stronger there is nothing to stop it from abrogating any agreement reached now, demanding additional concessions, and using military force if those concessions are not granted. The rising state may promise to honor the present settlement, but in the absence of an external enforcement mechanism, that promise has little credibility. The only concessions that would work to satisfy the declining power are those that would restrict the growth of the rising power, but the latter is not likely to find that acceptable.

Liberal Theories of Peace and War

Liberals recognize the potential conflict-inducing tendencies of anarchy but argue that under certain domestic and international conditions and with appropriate state strategies the violent-prone character of world politics can be ameliorated and levels of warfare significantly reduced. Until

recently, however, there was no coherent liberal theory of peace and war. That changed with the development of the democratic peace research program, with renewed interest in the hypothesis that economic interdependence promotes peace, and with attempts to apply theories of international institutions to questions of war and peace (Keohane and Martin 1995).

The emergence of an integrated liberal theory of peace and war represents the systematization and empirical testing of Kant's ([1795]1949) conception of perpetual peace based on democratic institutions, free trade, and international law and institutions. Here I focus on "republican liberalism" and "economic liberalism", which appear at this stage to have more explanatory power than institutional liberalism on questions bearing on interstate war.

The Democratic Peace

Liberals have long argued that democracies are more peaceful than are other states. The "democratic peace" did not become a coherent and visible research program in international relations, however, until after a number of studies in the mid-1980s offered persuasive evidence that democracies rarely if ever go to war with each other. Researchers then demonstrated that this empirical regularity could not be explained by the distribution of power, patterns of trade or alliances, geographical proximity, or other variables, and that most of the hypothesized violations of the democratic peace—the War of 1812, the Spanish-American War, and World War I, for example—are problematic because one state does not satisfy the criteria for a democracy (Ray 1995; Doyle 1997; Russett and Oneal 2001). While some say that Levy (cited in Levy and Thompson 2010) went too far to suggest that "the absence of war between democracies comes as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations," this remains the strongest empirical regularity in the field. The only question is how to explain it.

The dyadic-level finding of the near absence of wars between democracies does not imply that democracies are necessarily more peaceful than are other states—only that they almost never fight each other. Democracies are as likely as authoritarian states to get involved in wars; they often initiate wars; they frequently fight imperial wars; and they occasionally use covert action or low-level military force against each other (Bennett

and Stam 2004; Russett and Oneal 2001).[5] In addition, democratic-authoritarian dyads are more war-prone than are pure authoritarian dyads.

Scholars have suggested a number of explanations for the democratic peace. Two are the closely related *institutional constraints* model and the *democratic culture and norms* model (Russett and Oneal 2001). The institutional constraints model emphasizes the Kantian argument that electoral institutions constrain political leaders, since citizens will not generally vote to send themselves off to war. In addition, checks and balances, the dispersion of power, and a free press constrain political leaders from taking unilateral military action, ensure an open public debate, and require leaders to secure a broad base of public support before adopting risky policies. The democratic culture model adds that democracies have regularized norms of bounded political competition and peaceful resolution of disputes, and that these internal norms are extended to relations between democratic states. As a result, leaders use military force only in response to serious and immediate threats.

The institutional and normative models of the democratic peace imply that democracies are more peaceful than other states, but that hypothesis is contradicted by the evidence. Similarly, the argument that democratic states' fears of being exploited by authoritarian states leads them to shed the norms of non-violent conflict resolution procedures in disputes with authoritarian states implies that democracies will not attack weak authoritarian states who do not pose a threat. That implication is also disconfirmed by the evidence.

Most versions of the institutional model assume that leaders have more warlike preferences than do their publics, which is why leaders need to be constrained. This is not always true, and in fact belligerent publics sometimes push their leaders into wars those leaders prefer to avoid (the USA in the Spanish-American War, for example). Moreover, politically-insecure leaders often engage use military force abroad to trigger "rally 'round the flag" effects that bolster their domestic political support. This is the basis for the "diversionary theory of war" (Levy 1989), which some argue applies to democratic leaders even more than to autocratic leaders—because democratic leaders are more dependent upon popular support and less able to resort to domestic repression than are autocratic leaders.

The institutional and cultural models of the democratic peace also have trouble explaining the extensive imperial and colonial wars fought by democracies against much weaker actors abroad. These concerns lead some constructivists to supplement a democratic culture argument with an emphasis on shared identity among democracies (Risse-Kappen 1995). This provides a more plausible explanation for democratic hostility toward non-democratic states, but it is not consistent with the fact that democracies occasionally use covert action or low levels of military force against each other.

Many of these anomalies are explained by Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* (2003) in an alternative institutional explanation of the democratic peace that emphasizes political survival as the primary goal of political leaders. The model suggests that the political survival of leaders with smaller "winning coalitions" (found in authoritarian states) depends on their ability to satisfy their core supporters through the distribution of private goods. Political leaders cannot bribe everybody, of course, and the political survival of leaders with larger winning coalitions (usually characteristic of democracies) depends on successful public policies. This implies that democratic leaders are more sensitive to the outcome of wars than are authoritarian leaders, which in fact is consistent with the finding that democratic leaders are more likely than their authoritarian counterparts to be removed from office after an unsuccessful war. Because of the political benefits of successful wars and the political costs of unsuccessful wars, democratic leaders tend to initiate only those wars they are confident of winning and, once in war, to devote enormous resources to win those wars. Autocratic leaders devote fewer resources to war because the costs of failure in war are less and because they need those resources to distribute to their key supporters at home.

Democratic leaders understand that in any war between democracies, both sides would invest enormously in the war effort, resulting in a war that would be economically costly to both sides as well as politically costly to the loser. Thus democratic leaders in a crisis with another democratic state have strong incentives to seek a negotiated settlement rather than to fight. Because democratic leaders benefit from successful wars, especially those involving low casualties, they will not hesitate to initiate imperial wars and wars against weaker autocracies or even weaker democracies. This is consistent with the evidence.

Schultz (1998) provides an alternative explanation of the democratic peace based on the transparency of democratic institutions and processes. The basic argument is that because a free press guarantees transparency in democratic states, democracies are better able than non-democracies to send credible signals of their resolve in crises, which reduces the dangers of crisis escalation due to misperceptions.

In crisis bargaining, each government has incentives to exaggerate its resolve in order to enhance its bargaining leverage. Bluffing frequently leads to misperceptions of adversary resolve, and these misperceptions generally increase the probability of war. Democratic political oppositions, which Schultz assumes are purely office-seeking, do not have incentives to bluff. If they anticipate a successful and popular war, they will support the government, mainly to avoid the substantial political costs of opposing a popular war. If the war is expected to be unsuccessful or unpopular, however, oppositions have incentives to oppose the war and let the government absorb the full political costs of the unpopular war.

In Schultz's model, the government cannot fully implement its threats against the adversary without domestic support, and the adversary understands this. If the domestic opposition refuses to support the government's war effort, the adversary anticipates the government's weak resolve and thus increases its own resolve. Democratic leaders anticipate this, and they refrain from getting involved in crises in the first place when they do not expect support from the domestic opposition.

If political leaders expect the support of the domestic opposition, however, they will initiate disputes knowing they will be able to stand firm if the adversary resists. The adversary understands this and reacts more cautiously. As a result, crises involving democratic states are less likely to be characterized by misperceptions regarding the adversary's resolve and less likely to escalate to war because of misperceptions. In democratic dyads misperceptions are reduced even further, though whether this reduction is enough to account for the near-absence of wars between democracies is problematic.

The explanations for the democratic peace proposed by Bueno de Mesquita *et al.* and by Schultz

are each clear advances over earlier explanations, though neither has yet to generate a consensus of scholarly opinion and neither is likely to have the last word on the subject, as the study of the democratic peace continues to evolve.

The striking finding that democracies rarely if ever fight each other has been invoked by some, including US President Bill Clinton, to justify a policy of promoting democratization around the world. It is important to note, however, that democratic peace research deals almost exclusively with well-established democracies. It leaves open the question of whether the same patterns characterize states making the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule.

Mansfield and Snyder (2005) engaged this issue and argued that states involved in transitions to democracy are in fact more warlike than are other states, in part because of the temptation of new political elites to consolidate their power and enhance their legitimacy by using force against external enemies, real or imagined. Critical reaction forced Mansfield and Snyder to qualify their argument. They distinguished between the early and later stages of democratic transitions, and argued that emerging democratic states are more war-prone than other states in the early stages of democratic transitions but not in the later stages.

Economic Interdependence and Peace

The idea that trade and other forms of economic interdependence promote peace was a central theme in 19th century liberal economic theory, but the occurrence of World War I at a time of historically unprecedented interdependence of states did much to discredit the theory. Empirically-based research on economic interdependence and conflict in the 1990s helped to revive interest in commercial liberalism. The majority of empirical studies support the trade-promotes-peace hypothesis (Russett and Oneal 2001), but at levels far weaker than support for the democratic peace hypothesis. It also depends how one defines "peace". Trade does more to reduce militarized disputes between states than to suppress actual wars (Barbieri 2002).

Theorists advance a number of interrelated theoretical arguments in support of the trade-promotes-peace proposition. Perhaps the leading argument is the dyadic-level opportunity-cost or trade-disruption hypothesis: trade generates economic benefits for both parties, and the anticipation that war will disrupt trade and eliminate or reduce the gains from trade deters political leaders from taking actions that are likely to lead to war against key trading partners (Polachek 1980).

Domestic-level factors reinforce the link between trade and peace. Trade increases prosperity, and prosperity lessens the domestic problems that sometimes lead to war.[6] Prosperity can also generate a culture of acquisitiveness that dampens the martial spirit and diverts resources away from the military sector. As Blainey (1988, 10) notes of the 19th century, "Men were too busy growing rich to have time for war." Trade also alters the domestic balance of power within states by increasing the influence of groups who benefit from trade and who have a vested interest in maintaining a peaceful environment for trade (Rogowski 1989).

These explanations for the trade-promotes-peace hypothesis suffer from a number of analytic problems. Most ignore strategic interaction between trading partners. It is possible that if a dispute arises between trading partners, both will both refrain from belligerent actions in order to preserve the benefits of trade. It is also possible that one side might interpret the other's conciliatory actions as a lack of resolve and lead it to believe that it can exploit the adversary's fear of war by standing firm and thereby improving its own strategic or economic position. In the absence of additional information about expectations regarding the economic benefits of trade, the impact of war on trade, and each side's risk orientation and domestic sensitivity to those costs, the outcome—and hence the impact of trade on peace within a dyad—is theoretically indeterminate (Morrow 2003).

The "signaling model" of trade and peace attempts to correct for these limitations. Extensive trade ties between two states provides a number of economic instruments of policy that states can use to credibly signal their resolve should any dispute break out between them (since a loss of trade is a costly and therefore credible signal). Signaling displeasure and resolve by reducing trade is less costly and less prone to escalation than doing so through military threats.

Critics might counter that extensive trade between states increases the likelihood of getting into a dispute to begin with, since trade is a fertile source of conflict. In addition, if economic

interdependence is asymmetrical rather than symmetrical, the least dependent state may be tempted to resort to economic coercion to exploit the adversary's vulnerabilities and influence its behavior relating to security as well as economic issues (Hirschman 1945 [1980]). This is the basis for the realist argument that trade may increase the probability of war rather than decrease it.

Most realists argue, however, that the impact of trade on war and peace are far weaker than the impact of security considerations. Moreover, the causal relationship between trade and peace may be reversed, with peace creating the conditions conducive to trade. The more general argument is that politics shapes trade rather than trade shaping politics (Pollins 1989). The assumption that states are more interested in relative gains than absolute gains, and with the security externalities of trade (Grieco 1990; Gowa 1994), leads realists to argue that states limit their trade with potential adversaries because of the fear that the adversary might use the economic benefits of trade to bolster its military power and potential.

It is also possible that the inference that trade promotes peace is spurious, because some conditions that facilitate trade simultaneously promote peace. States with common interests tend to trade with each other and also to be less inclined to fight, so the association between trade and peace may be explained in part or in full by the commonality of interests (Gartzke 2007). There is more trade between allies than between adversaries (Gowa 1994) and between democratic dyads than between other types of dyads. This complicates the task of identifying a distinct "democratic peace" or "capitalist peace" (Gartzke 2007), and interest has shifted toward integrating democracy and capitalism into an integrated explanation of peace and war (Russett and Oneal 2001).

Conclusion

Our brief survey of theories of interstate war has focused on realist theories based on power and interest, on the liberal democratic peace and capitalist peace, and on the bargaining model of war. It is clear that debates on the question of what causes war remain as intense as ever. At the same time, however, few would accept the occasional argument that we have made little progress in our study of war since the time of Thucydides. There is in fact a growing consensus on several points. Scholars have been increasingly willing to

accept the view that war is complex, that a monocausal theory is unlikely to provide an adequate explanation of war, that a complete understanding of war must incorporate multiple variables at several levels of analysis, and that these variables may operate along multiple causal paths. Relatedly, there is also a growing consensus that no single methodology can provide a convincing test of theories of war, and that research programs on war are best served by multi-method approaches. The utility of multi-method approaches is particularly evident in the study of the democratic peace, where the convergence of findings generated by large-n statistical studies, historical case studies, and formal models has increased our confidence in the validity of those findings. This methodological pluralism is one reason for optimism regarding continued progress in the study of war and peace.

Notes

1 Levy and Thompson (2010) define war as "sustained, coordinated violence between political organizations."

2 For more comprehensive reviews see Vasquez (2009) and Levy and Thompson (2010).

3 Anarchy is defined as the absence of a legitimate authority to regulate disputes and enforce agreements between states.

4 Most people place much greater value on preserving what they have than on acquiring something new, and they adopt riskier strategies to avoid losses than to make gains. One implication is that political leaders fight harder to maintain territory, resources, power, reputation, and domestic support than they do to acquire those things in the first place.

5 Some recent research suggests than democracies may be somewhat more peaceful than authoritarian states, but the effects are modest.

6 Prosperity also expands the war chests that make war more feasible.

Bibliography

Barbieri, Katherine. 2002. *The Liberal Illusion: Does Trade Promote Peace?* Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bennett, D. Scott and Allan C. Stam III. 2004. *The Behavioral Origins of War*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*, 3rd edition. New York: The Free Press.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.

Clausewitz, Carl von. 1832 [1976]. *On War*, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Doyle, Michael W. 1997. *Ways of War and Peace*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Fearon, James D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49:379–414.

Gartzke, Erik. 2007. "The Capitalist Peace." *American Journal of Political Science* 51:161–91.

Gowa, Joanne. 1994. *Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Grieco, Joseph M. 1990. *Cooperation among Nations.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Hirschman, Albert O. 1945 [1980]. *National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade.* Berkeley CA: University of California Press.

Jervis, Robert. 1976. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kant, Immanuel. 1795 [1949]. "Eternal Peace." Pp. 430–76. In *The Philosophy of Kant*, edited by Carl J. Frederich. New York: Modern Library.

Keohane, Robert O. and Lisa L. Martin. 1995. "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory." *International Security* 20:39–51.

Levy, Jack S. 1989. "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique." Pp. 259–288. In *Handbook of War Studies*, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

———. 2008. "Preventive War and Democratic Politics." *International Studies Quarterly* 52:1–24.

Levy, Jack S. and William R. Thompson. 2010, *Causes of War.* Chichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.

Mansfield, Edward D. and Jack Snyder. 2005. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.* New York: W.W. Norton.

Morgenthau, Hans J. 1948. *Politics among Nations.* New York: Knopf.

Morrow, James D. 2003. "Assessing the Role of Trade as a Source of Costly Signals." Pp. 89–95. In *Economic Interdependence and International Conflict*, edited by Edward D. Mansfield and Brian Pollins. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Organski, A.F.K. 1958. *World Politics.* New York: Knopf.

Polachek, Soloman W. 1980. "Conflict and Trade." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24:55–78.

Pollins, Brian. 1989. "Does Trade Still Follow the Flag?" *American Political Science Review* 83:465–480.

Rasler, Karen and William R. Thompson. 2000. "Global War and the Political Economy of Structural Change." Pp. 301–331. In *Handbook of War Studies II*, edited by Manus I. Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Ray, James Lee. 1995. *Democracy and International Conflict.* Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. "Democratic Peace—Warlike Democracies? A Social Constructivist Interpretation of the Liberal Argument." *European Journal of International Relations* 1:491–517.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1989. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Russett, Bruce and John R. Oneal. 2001. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organization.* New York: W.W. Norton.

Schultz, Kenneth A. 2001. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy.* Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.

Thucydides. 1996. *History of the Peloponnesian War.* In *The Landmark Thucydides*, edited by Robert B. Strassler. New York: Free Press.

Vasquez, John A. 2009. *The War Puzzle Revisited.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Vasquez, John A. and Colin Elman (eds.). 2003. *Realism and the Balancing of Power: A New Debate.* Saddle River NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Wagner, R. Harrison. 2000. "Bargaining and War." *American Journal of Political Science* 44:469–484.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics.* Reading MA: Addison-Wesley.